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V. Sassone Theory for Ubiquitous Computing1 Motivation & Goals
Understanding trust based systems
Guidelines for their designers and implementers
Techniques for reasoning about their properties
2 Formal Models for Trust
A simple policy language
Trust semantic domains
Computing trust values
3 Observing Events
Event structures
4 A Calculus of Trust
Equational theory
Joint work with Mogens Nielsen, Karl Krukow, Marco Carbone,...Goals Trust Models Observing Events A Calculus of Trust
Global Ubiquitous Computing
Billions of autonomous mobile networked entities
Mobile users
Mobile software agents
Mobile networked devices:
Mobile communication devices (phones, pagers, ...)
Mobile computing devices (laptops, palmtops, ...)
Commodity products (embedded devices)
Entities collaborate with each other:
Resource sharing: Ad hoc networks, computational grids, ...
Information sharing: Collaborative applications, recommendation
systems, ...
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New Security Challenges
Security scenario for global computing environment
Large number of autonomous entities
Large number of administrative domains
No common trusted computing base
No global system trust
Virtual anonymity
Such requirements exclude the use of current security
mechanisms used in large distributed systems
An alternative approach: Trust based security
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Theory meets Practice
Theory’s success stories:
Veriﬁcation (relates to type checking/inference)
Certiﬁcates (groups as certiﬁed roles)
...
All this only works as long as you trust the certiﬁed types, or are
willing and ble to check and monitor migrating agents yourself (e.g.,
bytecode veriﬁcation, PCC, ...).
...one cannot “verify” the Internet
The gap between theory and practice matters in practice.
Trust: In UbiComp, security must work be coupled with trust
management.
Which is hard, because of delegation and dynamic policies
V. Sassone Theory for Ubiquitous ComputingGoals Trust Models Observing Events A Calculus of Trust
Trust and Trust Management
Trust: What is it?
Think of the usual human-like notion...
...but on a global computing scale.
Trust Management: Fundamental aspects?
1 Trust is gathered by individuals e.g. from personal experiences;
2 Trust is shared by communities, e.g. to form “reputation systems”;
Which means:
Principals act according to “policies” upon consulting “trust
tables,” and “update” these constantly according to the
outcome of transactions.
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Collaboration Model
Trust formation
Personal experience
Recommendation from known (trusted) third parties
Reputation (recommendation from many strangers)
External events (help build reputation)
Trust evolution
Incorporating new trust formation data
Expiration of old trust values
As a function of time
As a reaction to betrayal
Trust exploitation
Feedback based on experience
V. Sassone Theory for Ubiquitous ComputingGoals Trust Models Observing Events A Calculus of Trust
Collaboration Model
Trust formation
Personal experience
Recommendation from known (trusted) third parties
Reputation (recommendation from many strangers)
External events (help build reputation)
Trust evolution
Incorporating new trust formation data
Expiration of old trust values
As a function of time
As a reaction to betrayal
Trust exploitation
Feedback based on experience
V. Sassone Theory for Ubiquitous ComputingGoals Trust Models Observing Events A Calculus of Trust
Collaboration Model
Trust formation
Personal experience
Recommendation from known (trusted) third parties
Reputation (recommendation from many strangers)
External events (help build reputation)
Trust evolution
Incorporating new trust formation data
Expiration of old trust values
As a function of time
As a reaction to betrayal
Trust exploitation
Feedback based on experience
V. Sassone Theory for Ubiquitous ComputingGoals Trust Models Observing Events A Calculus of Trust
Some applications
A peer to peer distributed ﬁle system
A telephone-based micro-payment system
An agent controlled information portal
A distributed SPAM ﬁlter
(Secure Project)
A smart space environment
Collaborative PDA environment
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Trust-Based Security Decisions
Security-related decisions:
Passive: e.g.: should I allow principal P to access resource r?
Active: e.g.: which of principals P, Q, R will provide the best
service for me?
Trust-based decisions:
Decisions based on principals’ behaviour, reputation, ...
Principals collaborate: recommendations, ...
Principals are networked, decisions made autonomously.
Decisions made based on partial information.
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Entity Recognition
Background questions
How to recognize other entities
Digital signature
Behavioural patterns, time and place
Combinations of above
Limit risk of masquerading
Limit risk from change of identity
Slowly build trust – repeated changes of identity must result in very
few privileges
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Trust in the Social Sciences
Trust
D.H. McKnight, N.L. Chervany:
The Meaning of Trust
Trust in Cyber-Societies,
Springer LNAI 2246, pp. 27–54, 2001
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McKnight-Chervany’s Classiﬁcation
Trust
Disposition
Structure/Situation
Affect/Attitude
Belief/Expectancy
Intention
Behaviour
Trustree
Competence
Benevolence
Integrity
Predictability
Openness, carefulness, ...
People, Institutions, ...
Plus some computing speciﬁc: time-dependent, rapidly-varying, ...
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An Ubiquitous Notion Itself
“Trust is a term with many meanings.”
— Oliver Williamson (Economist, Berkeley)
“Trust is itself a term for a clustering of meanings.”
— Harrison White (Sociologist, Columbia)
“Researchers’ purposes may be better served if they focus on
speciﬁc components of trust rather than the generalised case.”
— Robert Kaplan (Leadership Devel, Harvard)
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Trust Management – Blaze et al
12
Trust Management Blaze, Feigenbaum et al
Compliance
checker
Credential 
system
Policy
system
Application
Credentials Action requests
V. Sassone Theory for Ubiquitous ComputingGoals Trust Models Observing Events A Calculus of Trust Policy Language Trust Domains Computing Trust
Elements of Trust Management
Language for Actions
Naming scheme for Principals
Language for Trust-Policies
Language for Credentials
Compliance checker and interface
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Towards a Formal Model
Goals: Formal understanding of trust based systems
Stephen Weeks
Understanding Trust Management Systems
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2001
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Week’s Model
Scenario with
A set P of principals (ranged over by a,b,c)
A set T of trust values
Trust information of a system represented by:
trust-state : P → P → T ,
where trust-state(a)(b) represents a’s trust in b.
Weeks argues for and assumes that T is equipped with an partial
ordering ≤ such that (T ,≤) is a (complete) lattice.
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Aside I: Complete lattices
A Complete Lattice is an ordered set such that each subset of
elements has:
a “least upper bound” (lub); and
a “greatest lower bound” (glb).
Let T = {N,R,W,RW}.
RW
R
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
≤ W
@@@@@@@@
N
@@@@@@@@
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
This formalises that given two trust “levels,” there always exist a trust
“level” which sums them and one which intersects them.
Do you agree?
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Modelling Trust
Each principal speciﬁes a policy. This is a local contribution to the
global trust, and depends on other principals’ policies.
Central notion: Delegation
“a’s policy” = ...“ask b”... , ...pbq...
This gives principals a with policies πa, where:
πa : (P → P → T ) → P → T
The collection of πa’s induces a global policy bundle:
Π : (P → P → T ) −→ (P → P → T )
In fact, Π = {πa,πb,πc,...} , λx.πx.
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A Few Examples
λx.x = c 7→ W;... abstraction
λx.(pbqx ∨ R) referencing
a : λx.(paqb ∧ pbqx) ∨ R discounting
a : λx.(...pbqx ...)
b : λx.(...paqx ...) cyclic delegation
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A Simple Policy Language
Policies and Expressions:
π ::= ppq (delegation) τ ::= t ∈ D (value)
λx : P.τ (abstraction) π(p) (policy value)
op(π1,...,πn) (lattice op) e 7→ τ;τ (choice)
p ::= a ∈ P (principal) e ::= τ cmp τ (comparison)
x : P (vars) p eq p (comparison)
e bop e (boolean op)
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...and its Semantics
Correspondence of language expressions and policy functions
([−])σm : (τ → T ) + (p → P) + (π → P → T ) + (e → Bool)
([c])σm = c
([x])σm = σ(x)
([π(p)])σm = ([π])σm([p])σm
([e 7→ τ0;τ1])σm = if ([e])σm then ([τ0])σm else ([τ1])σm
([ppq])σm = m([p])σm
([λx.τ])σm = λp : P.([τ])σ{x:=p}m
([op(π1 ...πn)])σm = op ◦ h([π1])σm ...([πn])σmi
σ : Vars → P m : P → P → T
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The Deﬁnition of Global Trust
Assume T is a complete lattice, given a monotone policy bundle
Π : (P → P → T ) → (P → P → T )
Global Trust is deﬁned as the least ﬁxed point of Π.
ﬁx(Π) : P → P → T .
Fixed point
A ﬁxed point of F : D → D is d ∈ D s.t. F(d) = d.
If D is a ordered, the least ﬁxed point (lfp) is the least such d.
If D is a complete lattice and F is monotonic, the lfp always exists.
“This is the ﬁrst time they all agree on the trust distribution.”
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Understanding delegation
Example:
a : p 7→ trusted; b : p 7→ paq(p);
q 7→ pbq(q); q 7→ untrusted;
z 7→ ppq(z); z 7→ paq(z);
Delegation, formally: Global trust as a ﬁxpoint. (Weeks)
π : (P → P → T ) → (P → T ) Local Policy
Π : (P → P → T ) → (P → P → T ) Collected Policies
Global Trust: ﬁx(Π) : P → P → T . But, is this good enough?
p : trusted q : untrusted z : ???
Cannot confuse don’t trust with don’t know: the value of ppq(z) could
become available later.
Need to account for uncertain knowledge of ppq(z) ∈ T .
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Trust Structures
(D,,v), where
_
is v -continous
where (D,) is a trust lattice and (D,v) is an approximation lattice.
Theorem
(T ,,v) yields an adequate model [[−]]σ : Policies → (P → P → D).
For any collection Π of monotonic policies there is a unique
global trust state, given by gts , ﬁxv(Π) : P → P → D.
The ﬁxpoint is computed with respect to v.
The framework supports the speciﬁcation of imprecise or
uncertain trust values.
Trust structure can be derived canonically from lattices (D,≤).
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A Constructive Approach to Trust Structures
Let (D,≤) be a structure of ‘trust values’ without uncertainty.
I(D) = {[d0,d1] | d0,d1 ∈ D,d0 ≤ d1}
Consider now the orderings  and v on I(D) deﬁned as:
[d0,d1]  [d0
0,d0
1] iff d0 ≤ d0
0 and d1 ≤ d0
1
[d0,d1] v [d0
0,d0
1] iff d0 ≤ d0
0 and d0
1 ≤ d1
 is the trust ordering used in decision making
v is the information ordering used in lfp-semantics
Theorem
For any complete lattice (D,≤)
(I(D),) is a complete lattice
(I(D),v) is a complete lattice
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Exemplifying Trust Structures
Access-rights often form a complete lattice.
RW
R
} } } }
W
AAAA
⊥
} } } }
AAAA
Intervals introduces uncertainty in a canonical way.
[R,R] [RW,RW] [⊥,⊥] [W,W]
[R,RW]
s s s s s s s
[⊥,R]
KKKKKKK
l l l l l l l l l l l
[W,RW]
RRRRRRRRRRR
u u u u u u u
[⊥,W]
IIIIIII
[⊥,RW]
TTTTTTTTTTTTT
FFFFFF
z z z z z z
k k k k k k k k k k k k
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Properties of Intervals
Theorem
Given a complete lattice (D,≤) and a continuous function
f : Dn → D, then the pointwise extension F of f is continuous in
(I(D),) and (I(D),v)
Example: addition and multiplication on the reals
Example: glb and lub on (D,≤)
Theorem
Given complete lattices D and D0, then I(D × D) is isomorphic to
I(D) × I(D0) and I(A → D) is isomorphic to A → I(D). with respect to
both orderings
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Operational Aspects
Trust structures TS = (D,,v) give a framework for denotational
semantics for collections of mutually referring trust policies.
No good if principals are unable to reason about their own trust
in others.
p ∈ P wants to compute ﬁxvΠλ(p) : P → D
Problem: function Πλ is distributed as πq, for q ∈ P.
Problem: in principle ﬁxv(Πλ)(p) depends on πq for all q ∈ P.
In practice, perhaps πp depends on a signiﬁcantly smaller subset.
Dynamically compute dependency, and then run a distributed
least-ﬁxed-point algorithm.
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Algorithmic Issues
Efﬁcient distributed algorithms for computing ﬁx;
Policy reduction;
Approximations often sufﬁce!
Abstract interpretation.
Proof carrying requests.
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A Distributed LFP Algorithm
Assume we have a trust-referencing graph already computed.
Principal a:
Compute local trust state ma (based on no info from other
principals), and send it to all b’s referencing a
Whenever a new local trust state is received, compute a new
local trust state based on this - if different from previous local
trust state, send it to all b’s referencing a
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Some properties
Lemma
For all local trust states ma sent by a, ma  lfpΠ(a)
Assume that  is v-continuous and that Π is -monotone.
Lemma
If for a particular snapshot λx.mx we have λx.mx  Π(λx.mx), then
λx.mx  ﬁxv(Π).
If m  ⊥v and m  Π(m), then m  ﬁxv(Π).
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Proof Carrying Requests
Assume r is sending a request to a which requires ‘high’ level trust
a :λx.pbqx × V ...
b :λx.x = r 7→ high;,...
Idea: Requester provides a certain m along with his request, which is
compatible with gts, i.e. m  ﬁxv(Π), and such that high  m(r).
That is, r is asked to explain why a should trust her.
Send m to all principals x for which m(x) is different from λx.⊥, and
ask a to certify that m  πx(m) (locally!). If that is the case, conclude
that m  Π(m), and hence that m  ﬁxv(Π).
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Making Decisions
Model: a trust decision involving entity p has a number of
possible outcomes, o1,o2,...,on.
Each outcome oi has an associated cost or beneﬁt, say cost(oi).
Trust values must convey enough information, that estimation of
probabilities of outcomes be possible, e.g.
expected-cost =
n X
i=1
cost(oi) · likelihood(oi)
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Trust and Risk
Requests/actions are mapped to Decisions
Decisions are mapped to possible Outcomes
Each outcome has an associated cost / beneﬁt to the principal
Trust model determines the Likelihood of each outcome
Decisions based on costs, likelihoods and local security policy
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Decisions and Outcomes Flow
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Trust Based Decisions
Request
Decisions
Outcomes
Trust based expected costs
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A Reﬁned Model
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Trust-based Access Control
Access
Control
Manager
Trust
Calculator
Cost
Analyzer
Request
Decision
decisions, outcomes
decisions, outcomes
trust
cost
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Trust Model
Goal: Find additional structure on T in such a way that T can
provide information of the form Outcomes → Likelihood.
Remember? A trust model: mathematical framework that
speciﬁes a global trust state: gts : P → P → T .
But which T ? - The trust-structure framework, TS = (D,v,)?
Yes, but an arbitrary complete lattice is too abstract:
How does one estimate probabilities of outcomes?
How does one update trust information based on behaviour?
Must formalise: outcomes, behaviour.
Require additional structure...
T = Outcomes → EvidenceValues
Outcomes and EvidenceValues also have structure...
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A Running Example: E-Purse
A GC-like scenario where entities store electronic cash in an
electronic ‘purse’.
Entities can transfer e-money from one e-purse to another, e.g.
to purchase services.
Entities can request a transfer of ‘real’ money from their bank
account to their e-purse.
Scenario: User p wants to withdraw an amount, m, from its
bank-account to its purse.
For this decision, what are the possible outcomes?
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Example: E-purse – Scenario
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E-Purse Scenario
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Example: E-Purse – Outcomes
From the user’s point of view, various events may occur:
Request may be denied:
Insufﬁcient funds on account.
Server down.
Timeout.
...
Request may be granted, and m units are transferred:
Bank withdraws n 6= m from account.
Bank withdraws m from account.
Transferred cash is forged.
Transferred cash is authentic.
...
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Structure of outcomes
An outcome can be described by a set of observable events.
These events have structure.
Conﬂict: both cannot occur.
e.g. ‘denied’ vs ‘granted’.
Dependence: a pre-condition for an event to occur.
e.g. ‘granted’ before ‘forged’.
Independence: none of the above.
e.g. ‘forged’ and ‘ correct amount withdrawn’.
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Modelling outcomes and behaviour (1/2)
A very well known model: Event structures
ES = (E,≤,#).
E models the set of ‘observable events’.
≤ ⊆ E × E: dependency relation.
# ⊆ E × E: conﬂict relation.
The E-purse example:
authentic # forged correct # incorrect
reject /o /o /o /o /o /o /o /o /o /o /o /o /o /o /o /o /o grant
jjTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT
88 p p p p p p p p p p p
aaDDDDDDDD
OO
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The General Idea
To model each transaction by an event structure ES = (E,≤,#)
Each principal maintains an interaction history:
A sequence, H ∈ Conf
∗
( ES), where each conﬁguration hi in H
models information from a particular transaction
H is extended by either adding an event to one of the hi’s or by
adding a new h.
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Modelling outcomes and behaviour (2/2)
Model: Outcomes as conﬁgurations
The E-purse example:
{g,a,c} {g,f,c} {g,a,i} {g,f,i}
{g,c}
p p p p p p p p p
{g,a}
j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j
NNNNNNNNN
{g,f}
TTTTTTTTTTTTTTT
p p p p p p p p p
{g,i}
NNNNNNNNN
{r} {g}
JJJJJJJJ
UUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUU
t t t t t t t t
i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i
∅
PPPPPPPPPPPP
h h h h h h h h h h h h h h h h h h h
Model: Behaviour is a sequence of outcomes
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Event Structures as Frames
Event structures as a common frame for interactions representing
observations and outcomes:
Evidence History: recording of observations (event structure
conﬁgurations) based on interactions
Evidence Trust: a derived evidence function on outcomes
(event structure conﬁgurations)
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Choosing trust values
Trust values: Outcomes → EvidenceValues.
EvidenceValues?
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Trust values: ConfES → EvidenceValues.
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Trust Model: Evidence Values
Assign quantitative measures to outcomes.
Just count positive and negative experiences!
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E-Purse: Deriving Values
• Deriving values
!
{d} {g}
{g, i} {g, c} {g,f} {g,a}
{g, a, c} {g, a, i} {g, f, c} {g, f, i}
(2,0,0)
(0,0,2)
(0,1,1)
(0,2,0)
(2,0,0)
(0,2,0) (0,1,1) (0,2,0)
(1,1,0)
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Trust Model: Evidence Values – Formally
For all x ∈ ConfES the effect of x is a function effx : ConfES → N3:
effx(w) =

 
 
(1,0,0) if w ⊆ x
(0,0,1) if x # w
(0,1,0) otherwise
For a history b = x1x2 ···xn, deﬁne eval : Conf
∗
ES → (ConfES → N3) by
eval(x1x2 ···xn) = λw.
n X
i=1
effxi(w)
eval(b) : ConfES → N3 i.e. eval(b)(w) = (s,i,c).
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Trust Model - Recovering the Orderings
Trust structure on T0 = ConfES → N3
Deﬁne v on N3 by
(s,i,c) v (s0,i0,c0) ⇐:(s ≤ s0) ∧ (c ≤ c0) ∧ (s + i + c ≤ s0 + i0 + c0)
(T0,v) is a complete lattice (up to top element, >v)
Deﬁne  on N3 by
(s,i,c)  (s0,i0,c0) ⇐:(s ≤ s0) ∧ (c ≥ c0) ∧ (s + i + c ≤ s0 + i0 + c0)
(T0,) is a (binary) lattice.
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Trust Model – Summary
The Model of Trust:
Decision as event structure ES = (E,≤,#).
(Partial) Outcomes as conﬁgurations ConfES.
Behaviour as sequences of outcomes.
Evidence values as eval(b) : ConfES → N3 derived for each
outcome from b ∈ Conf
∗
ES.
Trust values as ConfES → N3.
Trust structure on such values derived (almost).
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Jøsang’s Belief Logic
Belief Logic based on “approximated” truth values.
Let D be the unit interval [0,1] of the real numbers.
I(D) = {[r0,r1]|0 ≤ r0 ≤ r1 ≤ 1}
0
belief r1
uncertainty
r2
disbelief
1
Clearly related to our evidence values.
We can easily “normalise” N3 evidence to [0,1] on obtain a
probability distribution on maximal histories.
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Trust Management – Summary
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Framework Architecture
Trust
calculation
Risk
calculation
Trust
formation
(evidence
gathering)
Monitoring
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A Calculus of Trust
Systems:
a{ P }α | N
It consists of:
The Principal’s name
The Principal’s program
The Principal’s policy
The rest of the network
(b · c)y .P: Receive y from b along c, and record the
observation in policy α.
φ :: b · chni: if a can prove φ according to α, it will grant n to b
along c. E.g.
(x · print)y .Access(x,ColorPrinter) :: colPr · printhyi
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The Interaction Rule
Interaction
β ` φ α0 = α upd(b · c B ˜ m) b : ˜ m match p : ˜ x = σ
a{ (b · c)˜ x .P }α | b{ φ :: a · ch ˜ mi.Q }β & a{ Pσ }α0 | b{ Q }β
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The logic
Val = P + N: all principal and method/channel names allowed.
Val = P × Val
+: observations (p,ch,mess).
Deﬁnition
Fix any signature Σ augmented with:
constants Val;
upd : s × Val → s (s distinguished sort, represents memory).
Deﬁnition
A message structure S,Op is a term algebra for the Σ above. Let R
be a set of predicate symbols.
Let π be a set of Horn clauses L ← L1,...Lk over such S and R.
Principal’s policies α is of the form (π,#), for # ∈ S.
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The calculus
Deﬁnition
N,M ::=  (empty) P,Q ::= 0 (null)
| N | N (net-par) | Z (sub)
| a{ P }α (principal) | P | P (par)
|| (νn)N (new-net) | (νn)P (new)
| !P (bang)
Z ::= (p · u)˜ v .P (input)
| φ :: p · uh˜ vi.P (output) φ ::= L(˜ l) L ∈ P (null)
| Z + Z (sum)
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Example: A print server
Basic predicate Access(x,y), for x a principal and y ∈ {Color,BW}.
Site policy π : { x · − B junk < 3 → Access(x,Color),
x · − B junk < 6 → Access(x,BW)}
where x · − B junk counts the occurrences of junk messages.
Let a, the print server, and b be principals with resp. protocols:
P =!(x · printCol)y .Access(x,Color) :: printer · printColhyi |
!(x · printBW)y .Access(x,BW) :: printer · printBWhyi
Q = a · printColhjunki.a · printBWhjunki.a · printColhjunki
| a · printColhdoci
Consider N = a{ P }(π,∅) | b{ Q }α.
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Example: A bank recommendation system
Interpret messages as recommendations.
Assume message structure is the list of the last k recommendations
for each user. Let’s consider the protocol
P = !(x · mg)y .Grant(x,y) :: x · mghi.(x · pay)y |
!(ITAbank · rec)x,y
Policy for principal UKBank:
π = {ITAbank · rec B (x,Bad) + x · pay B no = 0 → Grant(x,y)}
which checks if the sum of messages from ITAbank of type (x,Bad)
and from x of type no is zero.
Mortgage allowed whenever there is not bad observed or bad
recommended behaviour.
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System Analysis
Based on a nice cluster of behavioural equivalences I don’t have
time to tell you about.
Barbed equivalence ∼ on networks in the usual sense
Various interesting derived equivalences:
Principal equivalence:
P and Q equivalent iff for all principal contexts Cp[P] ∼ Cp[Q]
Message structure equivalence:
m and n equivalent iff for all message contexts Cµ[m] ∼ Cµ[n].
Trust Policy equivalence:
α and β equivalent iff for all policy contexts Cπ[α] ∼ Cπ[β].
Network equivalence:
N and M equivalent iff for all network contexts Cν[N] ∼ Cν[M].
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Some Publications
M. Carbone, M. Nielsen, V. Sassone.
A Calculus for Trust Management, FSTTCS 2004 to appear.
M. Nielsen, K. Krukow.
On the Formal Modeling of Trust in Reputation-Based Systems,
SLNCS 3113
M. Nielsen, K. Krukow.
Towards a Formal Notion of Trust, PPDP , 2003
M. Carbone, M. Nielsen and V. Sassone.
A Formal Model for Trust in Dynamic Networks, SEFM, 2003
SECURE Project’s members:
Using trust for Secure Collaboration in Uncertain Environments,
IEEE Pervasive Computing, 2003
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Conclusion
We haven’t even started yet !!
Need:
more validation - application scenarios
develop speciﬁcation and reasoning techniques!
develop static/dynamic policy enforcement systems
integrate with tools
develop models of autonomy
...
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